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A JURY BETWEEN FACT AND NORM
ROBERT P. BURNS*
INTRODUCTION
A filmmaker, like a trial lawyer, knows that the "rhetoric of fiction"1
relies on the ordering and characterizing of details. Because the things that
are closest to us and most obvious are often the hardest see, I will begin by
noting eight details in 12 Angry Men2 which are so obvious that their sig-
nificance for the understanding of the film may be difficult to discern. I
will then discuss the significance of the film being a drama, and, as we will
see, a drama about a drama about a drama. Finally, I will identify six dra-
matic tensions that define the film's meaning.
I. EIGHT DETAILS SO OBVIOUS THAT THEY ARE HARD TO SEE
First, of course, the film is set in the fifties. There are pay phones with
rotary dials. Everyone smokes, usually cigarettes. The jury is composed
exclusively of white males, mainly middle-aged. One juror seems to be a
recent immigrant from communist Eastern Europe where, we are told, there
is no real freedom of expression. There is a reference to Mussolini which
would be rare today. One actor offers a Jimmy Cagney imitation to taunt
another. (I haven't seen a Jimmy Cagney imitation in decades.) Finally,
Baltimore, a decade before Frank and Brooks Robinson, is a team whose
dismal quality is worth a comment.
The jury room is a bit shabby. One juror complains about the lack of
air conditioning in the steamy New York summer. The fan doesn't work
initially. One of the pull-down towel dispensers in the men's washroom
fails. The windows are stuck and hard to open. There are no screens.
Through those windows the jurors can see the monumental structures of
New York's neoclassical architecture: perhaps government and commercial
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.
1. 1 borrow the phrase from Wayne Booth. See WAYNE C. BOOTH, THE RHETORIC OF FICTION
(2d ed. 1983) (1961). Indeed, it has been suggested that all rhetorical persuasion depends on the accu-
mulation and sequencing of detail, one of the reasons that legal education has to be unlearned before
becoming a passable trial lawyer.
2. 12 ANGRY MEN (Orion-Nova Productions 1957).
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buildings. (One juror points out the Woolworth Building and comments
that he has never been inside.) Compared to the solid establishment just
outside, the jury room appears to be particularly marginal, and the jury
itself an afterthought, an underfunded appendage to "the system."
Second, we see almost nothing of the trial itself. Decades of social
science research has shown that the trial itself and the "discipline of the
evidence"'3 that it offers is the most important aspect of the jury system.
The initial majority remains the most important predictor of the verdict,
though the significant, albeit minority, number of cases where that is not
the case shows the importance of jury deliberation.4 The film shows us the
judge droning on through a few final jury instructions in a thoroughly dis-
engaged and bureaucratic style-a perfect illustration of Chesterton's justly
famous rationale for the institution of the jury5-and a short cameo of a
silent defendant-young, dark-skinned, and in the context of the entire
film, probably Puerto Rican. We have access to the trial events only
through the accounts of-and sometimes controversies among-the jurors.
In this, we, the audience, are in the same position as are the jurors in their
dependence on the witnesses for their access to the underlying events of the
crime.
Third, the trial is a whodunit. The legally defined issue is the identity
of the killer. The jury must decide either/or, as is true in most criminal tri-
als, but here the underlying reality seems most congruent6 with that ei-
ther/or. The trial concerns a "brutally elementary fact." The defendant did
the killing or he didn't. There appears to be no more subtle issues of the
defendant's state of mind-no insanity or diminished capacity defense.
Now, this is only one kind of trial, even only one kind of criminal trial. The
underlying reality itself in other cases requires a higher level of interpreta-
tion: Did the defendant "possess" a firearm in violation of federal law?
Was he "knowingly" in possession? Did he "intend" the victim's death?
Was the victim "reasonably" in fear of his safety when the defendant shook
his fist and uttered certain words? There is a continuum here from "inter-
pretation" of what the action was to a determination of how it ought to be
evaluated, 7 either "before" the legal categories are brought into play (decid-
3. JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY 162 (1994).
4. See ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 145 (1999).
5. Chesterton wrote that most abuses occurred not because legal officials were stupid or evil, but
only because they had gotten used to it. See G.K. CHESTERTON, TREMENDOUS TRIFLES 56 (1968).
6. See Andrew E. Taslitz, A Feminist Approach to Social Scientific Evidence: Foundations, 5
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 8, 12-28, 31-34 (1998) (explaining that mental state determinations are
highly interpretive).
7. Iris Murdoch emphasized that the proper evaluation of human events involved the "accurate"
predication of mid-level descriptions of the events or actions. See generally IRIS MURDOCH, THE
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ing, for example, whether the defendant acted "rudely" or "suspiciously")
or in the application of those categories. A trial that is simply about identity
is a particular kind of trial, as Professor D. Michael Risinger has empha-
sized.8 I believe that juries in those kinds of trials are particularly depend-
ent on the pre-trial efforts of various legal actors-witnesses and
investigators prominent among them-whose errors and sometimes crimes
can have a sometimes deadly effect. They can subvert both the jury's own
common sense and the devices of the trial itself-usually very sure tools-
in a number of ways.9 We will see that even here, however, the practical
intelligence of the jurors contains important resources to resist that subver-
sion.
Fourth, in contrast with the brutally elementary nature of the issue10
before the jury, the case involves an accusation of patricide. Patricide was
the most heinous of crimes under Roman law, most subversive of sacred
tradition and the social order, and most brutally punished. 1 It is, of course,
an act of massive mythic significance, evoking the wild terrors of tragedy.
It turns out that much of the film is about the tension between the jury's
obligation to fairly try the question of brutally elementary fact within the
horizon imposed by the meaning of the event and the process of delibera-
tion itself. They must move between fact and norm. Norm is mediated by
meaning. These tensions will turn out to be enormously complex.
Fifth, we have no omniscient narrator (or director). We are not shown
by such a deus ex machina what "really happened," "already out there
now" real. 12 Our access to the event being tried is necessarily mediated
through the stories and arguments of the jurors, just as theirs is mediated
through the stories and arguments of the absent trial. Even the "brutally
elementary fact" of the death of the victim is mediated to us through these
stories and arguments. Thus the interplay between truth as correspondence
(or "accuracy") and truth as coherence or "integrity" of the processes of
narrative and argument is very subtle. Because our intelligences are "dis-
cursive"--dependent on the construction of narratives and arguments-and
SOVEREIGNTY OF GOOD (1971). Kovesi emphasizes the continuity between descriptive terms and
evaluative terms. See generally JULIUS KOVESI, MORAL NOTIONS (1967).
8. See D. Michael Risinger, Unsafe Verdicts: The Need for Reformed Standards for the Trial and
Review of Factual Innocence Claims, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1281 (2004).
9. See BRIAN FORST, ERRORS OF JUSTICE 66-133 (2004).
10. 1 am putting aside the complexity, discussed below, introduced by the jury's obligation to find
guilt only if the defendant has been proven guilty "beyond a reasonable doubt."
11. See Peter Garnsey, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Governors, 58 J. ROMAN STUD. 51, 55
(1968).
12. BERNARD J.F. LONERGAN, INSIGHT: A STUDY OF HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 424-25 (Philoso-
phical Library Inc., 3d ed. 1970) (1957).
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not intuitive--capable of an immediate identity with the object of knowl-
edge' 3-they may miss the mark. But because we can both construct and
then deconstruct our stories and arguments-and the devices of the trial do
just that-we are not fully prisoners of those stories and arguments. As we
see in the film, they can be self-corrective and can end with a practical
truth. We can never achieve an absolutely certain identity between our
beliefs and the event being tried, but we may achieve certainty about what
we ought to do given the evidence we have.
Sixth, the jurors conclude that they must deliberate based on an under-
lying proceeding, which was not a well-tried case. At several crucial points
the jurors judge that the defendant seems not to have been well-served by
his lawyer. They consider what explanation for the apparent failure is more
likely-that the lawyer was indifferent and underpaid or that he avoided an
inquiry or argument because it was damaging to his client-and judge that
the former seems the more likely explanation. 14 This means that the jurors
are left to do much of the work of construction and deconstruction that the
lawyers do in a well-tried case. 15 We will see that this often involves plac-
ing eyewitness testimony in the narrative context that allows them to judge
its plausibility. This means that the jurors have to perform two operations,
the first of construction and the second of evaluation. 16 Hannah Arendt
argued that judgment on political matters is fairly widely distributed among
human beings. 17 But that commonsense judgment has to be actualized or
realized.18 The ability to realize human judgment through the artistry of
deft speech is, on the other hand, much more narrowly distributed. 19 The
trial, in its ideal form, takes advantage of these differential distributions of
talent. It allows trial lawyers to engage in the operations of construction,
13. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 155-57 (Norman Kemp Smith trans., 1968).
14. Jurors #8 and #7 had the following discussion regarding the defendant's attorney:
#8: He was court-appointed.
#7: So what does that mean?
#8: Well, it could mean a lot of things. It could mean he didn't want the case. It could mean
he resented being appointed. It's the kind of case that brings him nothing. No money. No
glory. Not even much chance of winning. It's not a very promising situation for a young law-
yer. He'd really have to believe in his client to make a good fight. As you pointed out a min-
ute ago, he obviously didn't.
#7: Sure he didn't! Who in the heck could, except God come to earth or somebody.
Reginald Rose, Twelve Angry Men, in FILM SCRIPTS Two 156, 248-49 (George P. Garrett, O.B. Hardi-
son & Jane R. Gelfman eds., Irvington Publishers 1989) (1972) (screenplay version of the film 12
ANGRY MEN, supra note 2).
15. See BURNS, supra note 4, at 34-72.
16. Lonergan calls the former "direct understanding" and the latter "reflective understanding."
LONERGAN, supra note 12, at 279.
17. See HANNAH ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 62-64 (1982).
18. See PETER J. STEINBERGER, THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT 230-31 (1993).
19. See ARENDT, supra note 17, at 62-64.
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narrative, and argumentation-all of which enhance commonsense judg-
ment-and gives the power of judgment to the collective common sense of
the jury. In this case, this wise distribution of functions seems to have at
least partially broken down. If, as I have argued elsewhere, 20 the trial at its
best forces the mind downward toward the concrete, intensifies the compe-
tition over the meaning of the events being tried, and cultivates the suspen-
sion of judgment until all the aspects of a situation are explored, it is
perhaps not surprising that a jury that did not have the benefit of such a trial
almost goes badly wrong, at least initially.
Seventh, unlike in many criminal trials, the jurors know the actual
consequences of their "factual" 21 determination, either freedom or death in
the electric chair. The trial judge tells them that the death penalty is manda-
tory on apparently the only charge on which the defendant is being tried.
The jurors are not kept in the dark and left to guess about the actual conse-
quences of their judgment. The imagined consequences of a guilty verdict
provide the normative horizon within which the "factual" determination of
guilt or innocence 22 takes place. The latter judgment is based on our discur-
sive powers and, for reasons that we will examine at greater length be-
low, 23 always "underdetermined" by the evidence, from which competing
inferences may be drawn. This is the space for what Kalven and Zeisel
called the "liberation hypothesis"-the notion that factual uncertainty could
liberate the jury's moral sentiments from the consequences of the mechani-
cal imposition of the rules in the jury instructions to an accurately con-
structed (and value-free) narrative of events. 24 In the face of normative
discomfort with the consequences of conviction, they would then avoid
direct nullification by taking "a very merciful view of the facts."'25 For the
jurors in the film, the legal obligation to find the defendant guilty only on
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is not a matter of assigning a numerical
probability to that phrase. Rather, it is the more concrete judgment for
which they must take an inevitably moral responsibility, at least as to
whether the evidence is of a character that would justify the defendant's
execution. Juror #2, the bank teller, ultimately puts it this way: "You can't
20. See BURNS, supra note 4, at 132.
2 1. On the jurors as triers of fact, not of law, see id. at 18.
22. The jurors show they understand that the prosecution bears the burden of proving the defen-
dant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but by the end of the deliberations, the ever increasing number
of jurors voting for acquittal tends to speak of their conviction that the defendant is "innocent."
23. See infra text accompanying notes 35-40.
24. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 166 (1966). 1 have argued that the
"liberation hypothesis" takes a traditional paradigm of trial decision making, which is quite partial as
the full truth. BURNS, supra note 4, at 148 n.98.
25. PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 21 (1959).
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send someone off to die on evidence like that."'26 Though there is mention
of the defendant's poverty and the burdens of being raised by a criminal
and abusive father, these do not function directly as reasons to acquit out of
sympathy. Rather, they seem to provide reasons to respect him enough to
offer him their allegiance to the internal norms of deliberation. They re-
quire attention to the details of the case and adherence to the intellectual
"discipline of the evidence" 27 that leads them to acquit.
Eighth, in the script of the movie, we never learn the names of any of
the jurors, though we do learn each man's occupation. (In the film version,
we learn two names at the very end of the film.) They are Everyman. Henry
Fonda's character tells us pointedly that they are like everyone else, no
better, no worse. Each person's individuality plays an important role in the
deliberation, but it provides diversity of perspective rather than diversity of
individual interest.28 What the deliberation achieves is the emergence of
their common sense.
II. THE DRAMATIC FORM OF THE FILM
The film is, of course, a drama. Indeed, it is an on-screen drama about
an unseen courtroom drama, which may, if only by analogy, be said to be
about an unseen family drama. A drama is a multivoiced or "polyphonous"
medium. "It is the art form truest to life and the manifestation of complex,
pluriform, multiply-interpreted truth in changing circumstances. '29 It pro-
ceeds through time, and time is essential to it, as it is to the meaning of
human lives. In the best drama, no one character or voice represents the
truth the artist seeks to manifest. Indeed, that truth can only be expressed in
a multivoiced medium. It is also the medium best suited to express a form
of justice that can exist only as a tension of opposites. 30 As such, it is in-
consistent with the "propositional" form of truth that holds dominance in
the American legal academy 3' in which truth is a correspondence of propo-
sitions to the "facts" asserted. More broadly, it has been suggested that "the
26. Rose, supra note 14, at 331.
27. ABRAMSON, supra note 3, at 162.
28. Seeid. at 118-27.
29. Ben Quash, Drama and the Ends of Modernity, in BALTHASAR AT THE END OF MODERNITY
139, 165 (1999).
30. See generally STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT (2000). I have argued that this is
precisely the kind of justice that is consistent with our broader forms of life and that is well represented
at trial. BURNS, supra note 4, at 220-44.
31. James Boyd White has offered a critique of the propositional view of language and truth. See
JAMES BOYD WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW AND LEGAL EDUCATION
55 (1999).
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dramatic structure of truth" is at odds with certain temptations of modem
thought to single-voiced "epic" or "scientific" approaches to truth.
Drama does not seek to picture or mirror reality:
Works of art are not reproductions of a reality that can be identified in-
dependently of the work of art and used to judge the adequacy of its rep-
resentation; rather, the features of the objects works of art
represent ... are illuminated only by means of the representation itself;
certain events or features are exaggerated, the importance of others
minimized and the like. Hence the representation does not provide a mir-
ror of reality that exactly reflects it; rather, on Gadamer's view, artistic
representation shows the "truth" of "reality." As he puts it, "'Reality' is
defined as what is untransformed and art as the raising up of this reality
into its truth."'32
I have argued that the trial does something quite like this, though, in a
sense, the jury is offered two competing portrayals of what is essential or
most important about the case and it is up to the jury to determine through
its judgment the "truth of what is."' 33 In a sense the jury members are the
artists of the piece, though in a well-tried case they need offer only judg-
ment.
The film as we have it portrays a jury in this process of determination.
We have already seen that the jury has to take on more of the burden of
construction than would be true in a well-tried case. So we see a bit more
of that process than would be the case had the defense lawyer done his job.
We are watching the jury as artist. Of course, we have a dramatic portrayal
of the jury. The author and the director are offering their determinations of
"the truth" about jury deliberation. So it is not a representation of an em-
pirical average of jury deliberation, but rather of the truth of jury delibera-
tion, its "essence." And, because this is drama, we should expect that the
truth exists in the interstices of the strong positions taken by the twelve
antagonists. And we should expect that we can actually dwell in those ten-
sions, though we cannot easily represent or picture the truths that we can
discern there.34
We can say as an empirical matter that this jury is an "idealized" jury,
but drama is always about portraying the "ought" in the "is." And really in
32. GEORGIA WARNKE, GADAMER: HERMENEUTICS, TRADITION AND REASON 57 (1987).
33. Many opening statements begin with "This is a case about .... This is an appeal to the jury's
interpretive "as structure," the inevitability of even seeing an event as a kind of event. Trial lawyers will
typically identify (1) a legal theory of the case, an argument that under the fair meanings of the legal
rules and the facts of the case, they are entitled to prevail or at least receive a jury determination; (2) a
factual theory of the case, a single coherent narrative of events and motives; and (3) a persuasive theory
of the case, the moral basis for the jury's hoped-for action.
34. Charles Taylor uses the very helpful term "personal resonance" for our ability to discern a
truth that exists in a manner that we cannot easily gain "objective knowledge" of, but which "resonates"
with a reality that is not subjective. See CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF 510 (1989).
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the "is." It is about a portrayal of "situated ideals," ideals that are situated
in actual institutions and practices and need not be imported from "heaven
knows where." The jury portrayed is then, we would expect, not com-
pletely inconsistent with all of the empirical jury studies, but is not simply
a mirror held up to the least common denominator of actual juries. And, of
course, the appeal of drama to sensibilities beyond formal logic allows us
to see the "truth of what is" in the jury system. The drama wants us to re-
spond to the portrayal we see and, I believe, to approve of the jury we see
acting. Drama says that we can only approach the truth from the middle of
things and that a science that proceeds from Cartesian aloofness can only
be a resource, and not an ultimate touchstone of truth, for our ultimately
dramatic selves. The practical is primary for us as we try to understand the
trial, just as it is primary for the jury in entering its verdict. The film is then
successful if it reveals what is essential about jury deliberation in a manner
that evokes the feelings toward the institution that lead us to act appropri-
ately toward our jury system. In the same way, a trial is itself successful if
it absorbs the jurors in the drama of a human event in a way that allows
them to act appropriately in response to that absorbing drama. Put palely,
the truth it seeks is pragmatic.
It may be a weakness of the film that Fonda's character seems so cen-
tral. With the possible exception of the E.G. Marshall character, the stock
broker and rationalist, he is not really balanced strongly by any other voice
in the room. On the other hand, he declares at the start that he does not
really know the truth of the situation at all. He simply wants to talk about it.
As the film goes on, it seems that his Socratic ignorance generally acts as
the midwife for the emergence of the democratic knowledge of the entire
jury. Initially, he simply wants to give the case time and attention and allow
the jury's own practical reason to emerge in that process of deliberation.
His questioning allows the "democratic knowledge" of the entire jury to
emerge.
III. WHAT Is DRAMATIZED IN THE FILM
First, the film portrays the paradox of elevation of the jury's common
sense through its absorption in the finest of detail offered by the absent
trial. Anthropologist Clifford Geertz argued that understanding of human
events and practices requires "a continuous dialectical tacking between the
most local of local detail and the most global of global structure in such a
[Vol 82:2
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way as to bring both into view simultaneously. '35 Or in Iris Murdoch's
words, "What looks like mere accuracy at one end looks more like justice
or courage, or even love at the other."'36 The moral task, in her view, re-
quires "an exercise of justice and realism that is really looking. The diffi-
culty is to keep this attention fixed upon the real situation and to prevent it
from returning surreptitiously to the self. ... -37 (In the film, the Lee J.
Cobb figure, Fonda's principal antagonist, is, it seems, absorbed with his
own disastrous relationship with his son and reduces the trial to that rela-
tionship.) The jury begins, as we all usually do, with the "anxious, usually
self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil" over what they have seen.38 How-
ever, the worldliness of the public discussion of the facts of the case con-
tinually disciplines this lazy first take on the matter before it. Time and
again, members of the jury, with their extraordinary collective memory for
the most refined details, come to understand that the specific details of the
case make it impossible for them to accept the easiest stories that form the
"falsifying veil" that individual members try to fabricate. Did the defen-
dant's father "hit" or "punch" him? Did the old man in the apartment below
"walk" or "run" to the door? Did it take him "fifteen" or "twenty" seconds?
The decisive significance of those small shifts in detail demonstrate that
common sense provides the jury with an extremely refined medium by
which to assess the plausibility of different narratives, if it is provided with
a disciplined access to brutally elementary data. That common sense can
move closer and closer to an accurate account of this particular case as it
moves away from the lazy generalities within which we usually move-
and which the mass media generally leave unchallenged.
Paradoxically, these corrections of detail serve to change the meaning
of the entire story and challenge and deepen "the most global of global
structures." This is, I believe, where the "religious" dimension of the film
appears. Several times, the Lee Cobb character associates the questioning
that Fonda initiates as akin to "Sunday School" or preaching the gospel. He
finally tells his fellow jurors that the only person who could believe the
defendant is "God come down to earth." And, of course, the jury itself
comes to believe (or at least not to disbelieve) the defendant. It arrives at
this posture of belief by working through the details of the absent trial, by
taking them seriously. As one theologian put it, "we can only think toward
35. Clifford Geertz, From the Native's Point of View: On the Nature of Anthropological Under-
standing, in INTERPRETIVE SOCIAL SCIENCE 225, 239 (Paul Rabinow & William M. Sullivan eds.,
1979).
36. MURDOCH, supra note 7, at 90.
37. id. at 91.
38. id. at 82.
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the truth 'from the middle' of creaturely existence, and that this necessarily
involves a continuous activity of imaginatively constructive participation,
in which we develop our own interpretive readings of God's ways in the
world along with the readings of other people."
'39
Second, the film dramatizes the tensions involved in action under un-
certainty about matters of fact. This kind of Uncertainty is intrinsic to our
finitude4 0 and can never be eliminated in the practical contexts that are
concerned at trial. The individual "bits" of evidence that are supplied dur-
ing trial are "relevant" if they have a defensible relationship to one party's
narrative theory of the case, concretely, the God's-eye narrative of events
that his lawyer is likely to tell in opening statement. In opening statement, a
lawyer will tell the jury not primarily what the evidence will be, but what
the evidence will show. The doctrine of materiality will require, as a condi-
tion of offering evidence to prove it, that the lawyer has correctly con-
cluded that the particular narrative theory of the case is legally significant,
that its major features serve to support or disprove the elements of the
crime or claim identified concretely in the jury instructions.
The doctrine of logical relevance requires that each "bit" of evidence
be supported or "warranted," as Stephen Toulmin put it,41 to change the
probabilities that a material fact is or is not the case. (Material facts are
features or episodes in a legally significant story.)4 2 The warrants that sup-
ply the links between the detailed evidence offered and the theory of the
case are usually commonsense generalizations. 4 3 A prosecutor may urge,
for example, that the defendant's mother's alibi testimony for her son ought
not to be believed because "generally and for the most part, mothers will lie
to protect their children from serious harm." Notice that commonsense
generalizations have an open-ended character that require a further insight
into their applicability to the particular question before the court. 44 For
these generalizations contain a necessarily incomplete inventory of intensi-
fiers (". . . especially when . . ." e.g., her son is on trial for his life) and
qualifiers (". . . but not when . . ." e.g., the victim is the mother's beloved
husband). Once a threshold of admissibility is reached, it will be up to the
jury to determine the probative value of each "bit" of evidence by deter-
39. D.C. SCHINDLER, HANS URS VON BALTHASAR AND THE DRAMATIC STRUCTURE OF TRUTH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION 22 (2004).
40. See Robert P. Bums, How Law Knows in the American Trial Court, in How LAW KNOWS 126,
150-52 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2007).
41. STEPHEN E. TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT 124-25 (updated ed. 2003).
42. They may also be material by virtue of their relationship to issues of the credibility of wit-
nesses.
43. In a small number of situations, scientific "laws" may supply this link.
44. See LONERGAN, supra note 12, at 173-81.
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mining the relative strength of the commonsense generalizations that war-
rant the relevancy of that evidence in the concrete circumstances of the
particular case.
But there is more to it than that. The facts that support the qualifiers
and the intensifiers are often themselves disputed and their likelihood de-
pendent on other commonsense generalizations which contain intensifiers
and qualifiers, so that the strength of a party's case depends on an inter-
locking and mutually supporting web of inferences. Trial lawyers like to
say that "every fact has two faces." Each important fact in a triable case can
be connected by different commonsense generalizations to competing ma-
terial facts. The jury may be persuaded that the certainty of a witness about
an identification may be evidence of its trustworthiness or its suspicious
character. In our film, the fact that the woman who testifies against the
defendant has seen the defendant through her window in his apartment with
his father many times can be urged to show that her testimony is reliable or
that it is the result of her presuppositions. The fact that the defendant has
been slapped around by his father in the past makes it more likely that he
may have reached the breaking point, but also that it was hard to see "two
slaps in the face provoking him to murder."'45 The fact that the old man in
the apartment below heard the victim hit the defendant earlier in the day
provides a motive to the defendant but also an explanation for why the
witness may have assumed the person he glimpsed coming down the stairs
"must" have been the defendant. The defendant's experience with knives
made it more likely that he would have confidence to use one against his
father, but the further detail that this knife was a switchblade, it turns out,
makes it less likely that this experienced user would have used it in the
particular way that the evidence suggested it was used.
There are more complex sorts of competing warrants. We learn that
the defendant has had a hard life. The E.G. Marshall character, for most of
the film, is the embodiment of logic and detached reason. He is a stockbro-
ker, a profession where success involves the weighing of largely quantita-
tive evidence and making predictions guided by the "laws" of economics.
He takes a social scientist's view of the significance of the defendant's
background: it supplies an empirical generalization that predicts that the
defendant is likely to have killed:
I think we're missing the point here. This boy, let's say he's a product of
a filthy neighborhood and a broken home. We can't help that. We're here
to decide whether he's guilty or innocent, not to go into the reasons why
45. Rose, supra note 14, at 190.
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he grew up this way. He was born in a slum. Slums are breeding grounds
for criminals. I know it. So do you.
46
And the attitude he has toward the defendant is a logical conclusion
from the sociological generalization that he announces. It coheres nicely
with the "Crime Control"47 model of criminal law: "It's no secret. Children
from slum backgrounds are potential menaces to society. '48
The Fonda character offers another significance of his background, a
moral significance:
Look, this boy's been kicked around all his life. You know, living in a
slum, his mother dead since he was nine. He spent a year and a half in an
orphanage while his father served a jail term for forgery. That's not a
very good headstart. He's a wild, angry kid and that's all he's ever been.
You know why he got that way? Because he was knocked on the head by
somebody once a day, every day. He's had a pretty terrible nineteen
years. I think maybe we owe him a few words. That's all. 49
It may be true that all the great dramatic portrayals of trial scenes de-
pict both justice and mercy, but Fonda is not suggesting that acquittal is
appropriate because the defendant has had a hard life. He is saying some-
thing different. He is offering, in competition to the scientific account of
the Marshall character, a moral account that urges that the defendant's past
suffering deserves the respect that comes from the jury following in its own
deliberations its own internal norms. Those are some of the "most global
structures" that attention to the details of the case evokes.
Third, the film dramatizes what my colleague, Ron Allen, has called
the "democratization of inference" in the American jury trial. 50 As we have
46. Id. at 192.
47. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 152 (1968).
48. Rose, supra note 14, at 192. His far less rationalistic colleague puts it differently in response:
"Brother you can say that again. The kids who crawl outa [sic] those places are real trash. I don't want
any part of them, I'm telling you." Id. at 192-93.
49. Id. at 180.
50. Conversations with Ron Allen. Juror #11, who is a watchmaker and recent arrival apparently
from Middle or Eastern Europe puts it broadly:
Pardon. This fighting. This is not why we are here, to fight. We have a responsibility. This, I
have always thought, is a remarkable thing about democracy. That we are, uh, what is the
word?
(A pause)
notified. We are notified by mail to come down to this place and decide on the guilt or inno-
cence of a man we have never heard of before. We have nothing to gain or lose by our ver-
dict. This is one of the reasons why we are strong. We should not make it a personal thing.
Rose, supra note 14, at 276. His statement could almost be taken as a paraphrase of De Tocqueville's
classic celebration of the American jury:
The jury ... serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens;
and this spirit, with the habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institutions.
It imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion of right. If these
two elements be removed, the love of independence becomes a mere destructive passion. It
teaches men to practice equity; every man learns to judge his neighbor as he would himself be
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said, the judgment the jury makes depends on the strength of strands of the
vast web of interdependent commonsense generalizations as they are re-
fined by specific evidence offered at trial. This judgment is both empirical
and normative. The film dramatizes the pluralism of perspective and ex-
perience the jury brings to bear. We've seen the collective powers of mem-
ory of the details of the trial which the jury possesses. The film also shows
the breadth of the jury's "common sense and experiences in life," to use the
words of a commonly given jury instruction. One juror knows about the
effective use of switchblade knives. Another knows about the effects of
wearing glasses on the skin of the nose. Another knows from experience
about the patterns of motivations of lonely old men pushed into a public
forum. Another knows about the ways of detectives investigating a murder
case. Another knows about the motivations of young lawyers assigned
cases they do not want. The jury lacks the diversity of perspective that par-
ticipation of women might have offered, 51 but the considerable diversity of
class, age, and occupation contributes to the quality of the deliberation.
Fourth, the film dramatizes the way in which even the relatively unin-
terpreted narrative of "underlying" perceptual fact is necessarily a construc-
tion of the jury's practical reason. E.G. Marshall's character calls for the
application of cool logic: "Listen! I think it's about time we stopped behav-
ing like kids in here. We can't continue to allow these emotional outbursts
to influence us. Gentlemen, this case is based on a reasonable and logical
progression of facts. Let's keep it there."5
2
Initially, the assumption of the jurors is that "logic" operates on the
facts as supplied by the eyewitnesses. Juror #10 invokes a kind of positiv-
ism of testimony, suggesting that witnesses' testimony ought to be taken at
face value:
You're makin' out like it don't matter what people say .... What you
want to believe, you believe, and what you don't want to believe, so you
don't. What kind of way is that? ... What d'ya think these people get up
on the witness stand for, their health? I'm telling you men the facts are
judged.... The jury teaches every man not to recoil before the responsibility of his own ac-
tions and impresses him with that manly confidence without which no political virtue can ex-
ist. It invests each citizen with a kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which
they are bound to discharge towards society and the part which they take in its government.
By obliging men to turn their attention to other affairs than their own, it rubs off that private
selfishness which is the rust of society.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 284-85 (Henry Reeve trans., 1945) (1835).
51. See ABRAMSON, supra note 3, at 119-25.
52. Rose, supra note 14, at 243. The watchmaker knows that things are not quite so simple and
responds, "Facts are sometimes colored by the personalities of the people who present them .... Id.
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being changed around here. Witnesses are being doubted and there's no
reason for it.53
As the deliberations continue, the jury comes to see that they cannot
but rely on their own practical reason in determining the meaning of even
the eyewitness testimony, and therefore its credibility. This is true on the
purely empirical level. The jury comes to reject the old man's testimony
that he heard the defendant threaten to kill his father because it cannot be
integrated into a coherent narrative with the neighbor's testimony that a
train was screeching by during those seconds.54 And even if one puts aside
the "brutally elementary fact" of what the old man heard, there remains the
issue of interpretation or inference, the weight to be given to a defendant's
uttering those words in deciding whether he had an actual intent to kill. The
most obvious explanation offered for the defendant's returning to his fa-
ther's apartment after he had killed him (other than that he had not in fact
killed him) was that the defendant was initially in a panic and so left a knife
he needed to retrieve. But that explanation seemed inconsistent with his
having wiped the knife clean of fingerprints. And the theory that he thought
he could safely return because he thought no one had seen him do the kill-
ing was inconsistent with the neighbor's having screamed at the sight of the
killing. Of course, as E.G. Marshall's character points out, not one of these
considerations is decisive and there remain only deep webs of probability.
Fonda concedes this but concludes, "I think there's enough doubt to make
us wonder whether he was there at all during the time the murder took
place."'55 Finally, after the jurors conduct their own experiment in the jury
room, he is able to construct an alternative factual theory of the case or at
least of the witness:
I think this is what happened. The old man had heard the fight between
the boy and his father a few hours earlier. Then, while lying in bed he
heard a body hit the floor in the boy's apartment, and he heard the
woman scream from across the street. He got up, tried to get to the door,
heard someone racing down the stairs and assumed it was the boy.56
Of course, the jury's enterprise is not solely theoretical. It is a practi-
cal enterprise suspended between sets of competing norms. Lee J. Cobb's
character passionately invokes the norms of retributive justice:
53. Id. at 254-55. And again: "Somebody saw the kid stab his father. What more do we need?" Id.
at 211. And with regard to the older neighbor's testimony, "I don't see what we're going to prove here.
The man said he saw the boy running out." Id. at 263. Fonda's character places that testimony in a
narrative context in order to assess its credibility. See id.
54. On the significance of narrative at trial, see BURNS, supra note 4, at 167-76.
55. Rose, supra note 14, at 253.
56. Id. at 271.
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Excitable! You bet I'm excitable. We're trying to put a guilty man into
the chair where he belongs, and all of a sudden somebody's telling us
fairy tales ... and we're listening!
What do you mean take it easy! D'you feel like seeing a proven mur-
derer walking the streets? Why don't we give him his knife back? Make
it easier for him!
What's the matter with you people? Every one of you knows this kid is
guilty! He's got to bum! We're letting him slip through our fingers
here!
57
We have already seen Fonda's invocation of the respect that the de-
fendant is due. Again, what is due is not acquittal out of sympathy, but the
jury's careful discharge of its own responsibilities to treat him as an end in
himself and not as a means to some socially defined goal. "Well, I kind of
think that testimony which could put a human being into the electric chair
should be reasonably accurate."'58 The Fonda character tells the jury that
''every once in a while you read about a convict who's freed ten years after
the crime because someone else has confessed. '59 The jury has no choice
but to bear the burden of responsibility for the possibility of error in this
capital case and so make the responsible judgment about the level of uncer-
tainty they are willing to bear. The "purely" factual question even in a case
such as this cannot but be affected by the jury's sense of the importance
that defines the value-field within which that determination takes place. 60
Fifth, the film shows the only way forward through this seemingly in-
determinate value-field is the public nature of the deliberation itself. In the
main, it is not the individual virtue of the jurors that leads them to their
verdict, but the power of their conversation within a constitutional frame-
work. After Fonda's initial negative vote, they consider how to go forward:
"#7: So what do we do now? #8: Well I guess we talk.... I think maybe
we owe him a few words."61
As Kant put it, "a good constitution is not to be expected from moral-
ity, but, conversely, a good moral condition of a people is to be expected
57. Id. at 217,272.
58. Id. at 238 39.
59. Id. at 248.
60. On the notion of a value-field in the context of judges' decision making, see Felix S. Cohen,
Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 243-44 (1950).
61. Rose, supra note 14, at 176, 180.
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under a good constitution. '62 And perhaps most startling of all, given
Kant's notorious "moralism":
The problem of organizing a state, however hard it may seem, can be
solved even for a race of devils, if only they are intelligent. The problem
is: "Given a multitude of rational beings requiring universal laws for
their preservation, but each of whom is secretly inclined to exempt him-
self from them, to establish a constitution in such a way that, although
their private intentions conflict, they check each other, with the result
that their public conduct is the same as if they had no such intentions. '63
There does not seem to be any transforming moral experience among
the jurors. They seem to emerge from the deliberations pretty much as they
were. But the collective force of the argument seems to move them in the
direction that a single wise person might have taken. Is this simple "social
pressure" as social psychologists might study it? We can recall the old la-
ment, "He forced me to do it. He used logic on me." It may be that there is
a coercive force of reason, but it is not the kind of coercion we are normally
concerned about. Here it seems that the legally imposed requirement of
unanimity and the social pressure generated by the public nature of the
debate produce a result that is "better" than that at least some of the jurors
would have embraced as individuals. And recall that Fonda's character,
who seems to be the closest to someone speaking out of individual virtue,
is willing to submit to the collective wisdom should he fail to have per-
suaded at least one other juror. The surrender of individual purely moral
conviction ("Here I stand, I can do no other.") turns out to be the condition
to political effectiveness in the public forum of the jury room.
Finally the film is about anger. Cobb's character reduces the delibera-
tion to an expression of his own anger towards the world and his son in
particular. Juror #10's character remains absorbed in his fear of and then
anger towards the slum dwellers from whose number the defendant comes.
But anger has positive uses as well. Fonda is indignant about the tic-tac-toe
game two of the jurors decide to play. Juror #6 angrily tells Lee Cobb that
he "oughta have some respect" in talking to the older man on the jury: "A
guy who talks like that to an old man oughta really get stepped on,
y'know." 64 The watchmaker is indignant when the sports enthusiast
changes his vote apparently just to end the deliberations:
What kind of man are you? You have sat here and voted guilty with eve-
ryone else because there are some baseball tickets burning a hole in your
62. ARENDT, supra note 17, at 17 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, Perpetual Peace, in ON HISTORY
112-13 (Lewis White Beck ed. & trans., 1963)).
63. Id.
64. Rose, supra note 14, at 240.
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pocket. Now you have changed your vote because you say you're sick of
all the talking here.
Who tells you you have the right to play like this with a man's life? This
is an ugly and terrible thing to do! Don't you care ....
If you want to vote not guilty then do it because you're convinced the
man is not guilty... not because you've had enough! And if you think
he's guilty ... then vote that way! ... Or don't you have the.., the guts
to do what you think is right .... 65
Even E.G. Marshall's rationalist is so repulsed by #10's prejudices
that he finally reacts: "If you open your mouth again I'm going to split your
skull."' 66 Anger functions in other ways too. It breaks through the strategic
positions of the characters to reveal a truth they would like to hide, as when
Lee J. Cobb's character shouts at Fonda's that he will kill him and then
stands silent when Fonda says, "You don't really mean you'll kill me, do
you?"
67
Sophocles's Antigone is also a drama about the demands of justice,
both "natural" justice and the justice of the state. In the second great choral
ode in the play, the Ode of Man, the chorus sings of man as deinos, a word
sometimes translated as "wondrous. ' 68 The word, though, has a connota-
tion of "alien" or "frightening." The chorus tells us that man has achieved
an astounding level of control over the threats of nature through his cun-
ning and skills, powers that can lead him to good or ill.69 The chorus then
sings, in Martha Nussbaum's translation, "Speech, too, and
thought... swift as the wind, and the temper... that builds cities, he has
taught himself."'70 The word she translates "temper" (orgais) is often given
the tamer meaning of "dispositions," and the phrase, "the temper that builds
cities" can be so translated "the social dispositions."'7' But there is no doubt
that the term also can have the meaning Nussbaum gives it: anger, wrath, 72
or perhaps even rage. She argues that the dramatist is suggesting that our
65. Id. at 309-10.
66. Id. at 315.
67. Id. at 274.
68. SOPHOCLES, Antigone, in THE THREE THEBAN PLAYS 55, 76, 1.378 (Robert Fagles trans.,
Penguin Books 1984).
69. Id. at 76-77, 11.386-416.
70. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, THE FRAGILITY OF GOODNESS: LUCK AND ETHICS IN GREEK
TRAGEDY AND PHILOSOPHY 72 (1986).
71. HENRY GEORGE LIDDELL & ROBERT SCOTT, A GREEK-ENGLISH LEXICON 1246 (1985). The
term astunomous, which Nussbaum translates "that builds cities" can be translated "abiding the laws of




drive for "civil control" is rooted in the rage we feel at our vulnerability 73
before the social as well as the natural world.
Our film displays the centrality of anger "for good and ill" in our civic
life. By the end of the film almost every juror, with the possible exception
of the pathologically disengaged ad man, has grown angry. Some jurors are
furious over personal and social forces that the defendant represents. But
for others, anger serves purposes that build and rule the democratic city. It
stands in stark contrast to the indifference of the bureaucratic judge. It pro-
vides the indignation that demands that jurors pay attention to the specific
details of this case and to the internal norms of the jury deliberation itself.
The drama is the art form "truest to life and the manifestation of complex,
pluriform, multiply interpreted truth" and perhaps the most powerful me-
dium by which we can begin to understand trial by jury:
[D]rama awakens impulses in us which are beyond any notion we may
have of individual rational control (and the "control" of "reason", we
may note, is a particularly dominant conception in certain strands of
modem thought). But there is more to take account of. Our agency is
also conditioned by the related fact of being ineluctably social (it in-
volves entanglement with the things experienced by other people). In this
way drama raises with a particular, authoritative urgency the question of
what it is not only to be free, but (more than that) to be free in the com-
pany of others.
74
73. NUSSBAUM, supra note 70, at 75.
74. Quash, supra note 29, at 144 (emphasis added).
[Vol 82:2
